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Global communication and political culture
in the semi-periphery: the rise of the Globo
corporation
PETER WILKIN
Abstract. This article will oﬀer a description and explanation of the rise of the Brazilian media
corporation Globo by situating it in the context of the periphery and semi-periphery of the
World System and the globalisation of communication. In particular it focuses upon the
changing role that Globo has played in the construction of an elite-led political culture in
Brazil that has moved through phases of authoritarian and democratic government. The article
sets out an historical account of the emergence of Globo from being a regional media
organisation in the periphery of the world system to a global broadcaster in the semi-periphery.
It moves through three phases: First, 1925–1964, the colonial legacy and Brazil in the
periphery; second, 1964–1985, a period of transition and conservative modernisation, into the
semi-periphery; and finally, 1985 onwards, the age of globalisation.
Introduction
The aim of this article is to provide a description and explanation of the rise of the
Brazilian media corporation Globo by situating it in the context of the periphery and
semi-periphery of the world system. In particular it focuses upon the changing roles
that Globo has played in the construction of an elite-led political culture in Brazil
that has moved through phases of authoritarian and democratic government. I will
begin with a brief discussion of the concept of the semi-periphery and its relevance for
the discussion of Globo that follows. I will then turn to an historical account of the
emergence of Globo from being a regional media organisation to a vertically and
horizontally integrated global corporation with interests in: horizontal – film, music,
television, print, radio, telecommunications’ and the internet; vertical – property,
banking, manufacturing, insurance and construction, employing overall around
23,000 people.1
In this article I will focus on three major issues in Globo’s history and how they
relate, in turn, to the political economy of global communication. The first of these
is the importance of Globo in the development of Brazilian political culture and how
this has evolved from a largely domestic nation-building agenda to an increasingly
global focus reflecting the transition in the 1990s from the Cold War to an era of
neoliberal governance. The second factor is that most work on global communication
1 Ketupa.net: A media industry resource, ‘Globo’, 〈http://www.ketupa.net/globo.htm〉, last viewed 20
April 2006.
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has tended to focus upon media based in the core rather than the semi-periphery.
Globo is a corporation based in a state that has moved from the periphery to the
semi-periphery over the course of its history, developing increasingly important links
with core based corporations and capital. What this illustrates is that this develop-
ment does not in itself do anything to remove the dependent nature of Globo’s
relationship to the core. Instead it renders it only more complex and intertwined with
the fortunes of the core. Finally I will also clarify the ways in which Globo has
become a major media actor with a global cultural reach, producing programmes for
a worldwide market and making tentative eﬀorts to invest in sectors of the core.
Globo is an important case because it highlights the strengths and weaknesses of
corporations based in the semi-periphery of the world system.
The article situates Globo in what I see as three distinct phases for Brazil in the
world system. First, 1925–1964, the colonial legacy and Brazil in the periphery;
second, 1964–1985, a period of transition and conservative modernisation, into the
semi-periphery; and finally, 1985 onwards, the age of globalisation. These three
periods see Brazil move from the periphery to the semi-periphery of the world system,
and Globo evolve from an important national and regional media company to
become a global broadcaster with major cultural capital and increasingly important
links with global media companies from the core. The route of Globo’s development
reflects Brazil’s integration into the capitalist world system. I will conclude by looking
at the major challenges to Globo in the C21 and by extension the issues that this
raises for the political economy of global communication.
Communication in the semi-periphery
‘Yes, I use this power . . . always in a patriotic way, trying to correct things, seeking paths for
the country and its states’.
Roberto Marinho, The New York Times, 1987.2
‘In ancient Rome, only the Romans voted. In modern global capitalism, only the Americans
vote, not the Brazilians’.
George Soros, Folha de S. Paulo, 2002.3
Why, then, is World-Systems Analysis (WSA) a better way of interpreting Globo’s
development, mass communication and global political economy than its orthodox
theoretical alternatives, realism and liberalism? Whilst there is not space to go into a
lengthy debate here about these issues it is useful to illustrate the strengths of WSA
when compared to realism and liberalism by focusing upon three areas:
Historical structures
WSA emphasises that the modern world system is just that, a system with an origin
and trajectory that develops over time and within which there are important
2 Luis Felipe Miguel and Paolo Simoes, ‘The Globo Television Network and the Election of 1998’,
Latin American Perspectives, 27:115, no. 6 (2000), p. 69.
3 Soros quoted by Steven Dudley, ‘Lula Needs a Miracle’, The Progressive, October 2002:
〈http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1295/is_10_66/ai_93457090〉, last viewed 18 April 2006.
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qualitative social, political and economic developments. In particular, WSA provides
a persuasive account of the causes of inequality and uneven development in the world
system. This explanation is rooted in the historical structures of a system that has
divided the world into a core, periphery and semi-periphery, patterns of uneven
development that reproduce themselves not only as zones that structure the world
system through a division of labour but that also increasingly reflect patterns of
inequality within states. By comparison liberalism and realism in their contemporary
forms tend to eschew a concern with questions of history (neorealism) or structure
(neoliberalism) and therefore lack the theoretical tools to provide a deep understand-
ing of the development of the world system.4
Unidisciplinarity
As the Fernand Braudel Centre have persistently argued, ‘In this light, we believe that
the problem is not to find an interdisciplinary meeting ground of the study of
historical sequence (history) and the study of structures (anthropology, sociology,
and other social sciences). It is to perceive our study as an imbricated whole with a
single theoretical framework, within which diﬀerent scholars will of course emphasise
diﬀerent immediate concerns and therefore frequently use diﬀerent approaches,
emphases, methodologies . . . We are further uncomfortable with the traditional
divide of humanities versus the (social) sciences. At least at the level of explaining
large-scale social change over time, we find that it is not very meaningful to
distinguish between a humanistic and a scientific approach. We wish primarily to
explain systematically and coherently what is fundamentally a single occurrence, the
development of the modern world-system.’5 WSA is important for international
relations because it advocates a unidisciplinary approach to the social sciences. As the
above quote illustrates, the traditional academic disciplines have served to obscure
rather than aid understanding of the social world.
By contrast, neorealism wants to preserve the idea that politics and high politics
in particular are distinct areas of study and practice whilst neoliberals try to separate
politics and economics in theory and practice.6 The consequence of this is that both
of the latter provide limited accounts of the ways in which politics and economics
shape the world system and tend to ignore culture altogether.
Globalisation
The emergence of globalisation as both a description of and a theoretical approach
to international relations was preceded by WSA by nearly twenty years. The idea that
the world has become integrated into a complex whole is one that has been examined
by WSA since its inception and it has produced a wide-ranging body of work over the
4 On the theoretical limitations of neorealism and neoliberalism, see Peter Wilkin, ‘Global Poverty
and Orthodox Security’, Third World Quarterly, 23:4 (2002), pp. 633–45.
5 Fernand Braudel Center, Newsletter no. 30, November 2006.
6 Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Liberalism, Realism and Socialism (New York:
W. W. Norton, 1997).
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past thirty years to explore what this means for all areas of social life.7 Both
liberalism and realism treat globalisation as a recent phenomenon whilst WSA oﬀers
detailed historical accounts of the rise of the modern world system as a single global
unit.
According to WSA the semi-periphery plays a crucial part in stabilising the world
system. It does this by providing the possibility of progress or development for all
states, from the periphery, to the semi-periphery and ultimately the core. The
ideological aspect of this developmental doctrine is reflected in the theoretical belief
that all states can ‘develop’ in this way. The reality is that the dynamic of global
capital accumulation means that they cannot, as it is fundamentally a system where
the core exploits both the periphery and semi-periphery, producing patterns of
uneven development. Development and government policy in the periphery and the
semi-periphery is ultimately subordinate to and dependent upon the actions of the
core. For example, the debt crisis that hit much of the periphery and the semi-
periphery in the 1980s and which persists today is a good example of this as it was the
direct result of a major interest rate hike by the US Federal Reserve Board in the
period 1979–1981, known as the ‘Volcker shock’. Paul Volcker then, chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, raised US interest rates from 9 per cent in October 1979
to 21.5 per cent in January 1981. The impact of this policy was brutal for the working
class in the core but devastating for those in much of the periphery and the
semi-periphery (such as Brazil) where cheap loans from banks in the Core had been
a major mechanism to stimulate growth and development in the previous decade. As
Branford and Kucinski note, the impact of these interest rate increases by the US
Federal Reserve Board was to raise Brazil’s interest rate bill by 250 per cent from
1979 to 1982.8 The control of credit and finance remains a major mechanism of
control for the core over the rest of the world system, as former US Government
economic advisor Michael Hudson has written.9
The development of communication within the world system has occurred on four
interlocking levels: local, national, regional and global. The global framework for this
has been constructed through the eﬀorts of the core states from the laying of
telegraphy cables to the introduction of the Internet. It is the core that has directed
these developments either with the consent of subordinate partners in the periphery
and the semi-periphery or during its phases of direct imperial control in the C19 and
C20. The structure of global communication has been to sustain what is often
referred to as the ‘digital divide’ whereby the core dominates the production,
distribution and consumption of communication goods and services.10 This divide
provides the core with diﬀerent forms of power over the world system:
1. Technological: The core dominates the production, distribution and control of
new Information and Communication Technology (ICT).
2. Ideological: The core dominates the production, distribution and consumption of
global news and information through its news agencies, media corporations and
control of the Internet.
7 For a critical view on WSA, see Robert J. Holton, Globalisation and the Nation State (London:
Macmillan, 1998).
8 Sue Branford and Bernard Kucinski, The Debt Squads (London: Zed Books, 1988), p. 95.
9 Michael Hudson, Super Imperialism (London: Pluto Press, 2003).
10 Hamid Mowlana, Global Communication in Transition (London Sage, 1996), ch. 1; Dayan Thussu,
International Communication (London: Arnold, 2000), ch. 1.
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3. Cultural: The core dominates the production, distribution and consumption of
global cultural goods and services from cinema to television. Even in an age where
significant cultural industries have emerged in India, Brazil and Mexico, it is the
core that shapes the international agenda for the regulation of communication
markets.
4. Financial: It remains the finances of the core that dominate investment in the
global communication industries. The case of Globo that I set out in this article
is illustrative of this point. Even a company as important as Globo is still
restricted by the instability of its position in the semi-periphery.
Throughout the world system mass communication has performed a number of
similar roles. It has been a crucial factor in nation-building and the Brazilian military
saw this as Globo’s key role after the coup in 1964. Thus the means of communi-
cation have been central to the production, reproduction and transformation of
social relations throughout the world system by attempting to promote forms of
shared identity (imagined community) and constructing common news and cultural
agendas.
One of the key diﬀerences between the core and the semi-periphery on the issue of
mass communication concerns the types of government to be found in each zone. The
semi-periphery has tended thus far to move between democratic and authoritarian
forms of government who have often sought to use the means of communication as
a mechanism of explicit propaganda control over the subordinate and oppositional
sectors of the population, usually backed up with state violence. One consequence of
this is that the experience of journalists in the semi-periphery is far more dangerous
than that of those working in the core. Being a critical voice in the Brazilian or
Mexican media can get you killed. That said, even on the issue of propaganda it needs
to be stressed that the division between core and semi-periphery is a continuum
rather than a clear divide. The media in the core frequently serve propagandistic
purposes as the ongoing War on Terror has been shown to illustrate.11
The means of communication in Brazil have been shaped by the countries
particular place in the structure of the world system since the C16. The most
important factors aﬀecting Brazil’s evolution have been: its geographic size and
relatively low population levels for much of its history; the concentration of
populations around the east coast; the dominance of the military in Brazilian political
culture; the extremes of inequality and poverty that have limited the domestic market
in Brazil; its political dominance by the USA as the regional hegemon in Latin
America; its economic underdevelopment and historical dependence on the core for
investment.
Thus WSA provides a framework for understanding the uneven and dependent
nature of core, periphery and semi-periphery relations within the world system, a
framework that serves as the basis for empirical study. An important factor to
remember and one that is often overlooked by its critics is that WSA expects to see
movement within the world system. Membership of the core changes over time and
the largest semi-periphery states such as China, India and perhaps Brazil have the
potential to move into the core given their relative resources and/or regional
dominance.
11 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).
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Building Globo in the periphery: the colonial legacy, 1925–1964
The newspaper ‘O Globo’ was founded by Irenau Marinho in 1925 but was taken
over almost immediately upon his death by his son Roberto Marinho. The latter
became the driving force behind the development of Globo as a major media
corporation. For the first 40 years of its existence the company was one of a number
of competing media outlets in Brazil, certainly not pre-eminent. Its original owner-
ship structure was similar to that of media corporations in many core states: family
dominated. The family pattern of ownership of media corporations was also a
familiar one throughout the South American periphery and this has remained the
case until recently. The last decade has seen Globo and other South American media
corporations such as Televisa (Mexico) change their patterns of ownership as they
become more firmly integrated into the capitalist world system. The main reason for
this has been the globalisation of financial and media markets that has intensified the
need to attract foreign investment for companies in the semi-periphery. I will turn to
this in more detail in the final section of the article.
In this early phase Marinho sought to ensure that there was a degree of critical
distance between Globo, the state and existing political parties. In this respect Globo
played the role of Fourth Estate in a system where the boundaries were shaped by the
political struggles between elite-led liberal and conservative political parties, both of
which were pro-capitalist but with diﬀering strategies for the development of Brazil.
The liberal fraction favoured integration into the world system whilst the conserva-
tive fraction sought protection from it. Nonetheless, given the social and elite
background of the Marinho family, Globo was always a part of the governing
structure of Brazil and supportive of the liberal capitalist model. Like mainstream
media corporations in the core Globo was able to criticise existing institutions within
limits. The overriding goal of such criticisms was to preserve a public realm for the
dominant classes in Brazilian society to maintain its hold over politics, land and
property.
In this period Brazil was a country struggling with its colonial past that saw it
trapped into an uneven process of development. Whilst parts of Brazil’s economy
were making significant inroads towards industrialisation (the south-east in particu-
lar) much of the country remained dominated by feudal structures of economic
production based around agriculture. Overall Brazil lacked the pre-requisites of
meaningful nationhood: a viable transport and communication infrastructure and a
national media that might help establish the idea of Brazil as an ‘imagined
community’.12
The state itself proved to be a mixture of strength and weakness in this period. Its
strength was reflected in its aspirations to establish a corporatist political culture that
would enable elites to work together in order to shape the direction of Brazilian
development, manifesting itself in a series of shifts between dictatorship and
democracy. The Vargas regimes (1937–1945) are perhaps the most well known
example of this ‘authoritarian populism’ and Brazil’s corporatism owed something to
fascist ideology with its emphasis upon an elite-led political system that protected the
12 Jose Marques de Melo, ‘Development of the Audiovisual Industry in Brazil’, Canadian Journal of
Communication, 20:3 (1995), 〈http://www.cjc-online.ca/viewarticle.php?id=303&layout=html〉, last
viewed 20 April 2006.
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position of the dominant social classes against the poor that continue to make up the
majority of Brazil’s population.13 At the same time, the weakness of the state was
reflected in Brazil’s constitutional structure and the conflict amongst elites over the
modernisation of Brazil.14 Although the President has always possessed strong
formal powers, in practice the decentralised nature of Brazil’s federal system and its
semi-autonomous geographical regions meant that local elites at the state level were
largely able to resist moves by the federal government for greater control over
national developmental projects.15 Brazil’s political system and the absence of
long-standing party political structures with their roots in social movements meant
that political power rested upon a complex and shifting array of alliances between
elite groups. The impact of these structures was to produce and reproduce a deeply
corrupted political system within which the state was split between its need to build
alliances with fractions of Brazil’s elites, in patron-client manner, and the need to
pursue what it saw as its national developmental goals. It is within this context that
Globo began to develop.
Globo’s business strategy was a mixture of specific goals and contingent oppor-
tunities. Marinho cultivated links with politicians as part of Globo’s drive to expand
its interests and a number of developments worked in its favour in this period. First,
Globo secured radio station licences in 1944 enabling it to move into the realm of
broadcasting thus expanding its reach within Brazil. Second, and crucially, in 1957 it
gained its first licence to broadcast TV programmes. Again, it must be stressed that
at this stage Globo was not the pre-eminent TV broadcaster in Brazil (that was its
then rival TV Tupi, the first TV broadcaster in South America, which eventually
closed in 1980) and ultimately it was the geopolitics of the Cold War that provided
the opportunity for Globo to seize its dominant cultural position.
In 1960 Quadros was elected President of Brazil and he quickly antagonised senior
military oﬃcers and the US administration of President Kennedy. The military feared
that he had the ambition to become a populist dictator who would use his popular
support to challenge existing social structures. Military intervention has a long
history in Brazil, dating back to the monarchist period (1822–1889) and the Old
Republic (1889–1930).16 Despite the populist pretensions of the Quadros admin-
istration Globo was able in 1962 to sign a secret and ultimately illegal deal with the
US firm ‘Time Life’ that was to prove the key to its domination of Brazilian
broadcasting. The deal gave Globo financial investment of around $US6 m and key
technical support enabling it to produce the high-quality programming that is
associated with the company. In addition, ‘Time Life’ worked with the CIA to direct
advertising to Globo, enabling Globo to develop a nationwide advertising cartel.
Most advertising agencies in Brazil at the time were branches of US multinationals.17
13 Emir Sader and Ken Silverstein, Without Fear of Being Happy: Lula, The Workers Party and Brazil
(London: Verso, 1991), p. 12; Robert J. Alexander, The ABC Presidents (London: Greenwood
Press, 1992), pp. 91–116; Thomas E. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil 1930–64 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1967), pp. 3–142.
14 Alfredo Saad-Filho, ‘New Dawn or False Start in Brazil?’, Historical Materialism, 11:1 (2003), p. 8.
15 De Melo, ‘Development of the Audiovisual Industry in Brazil’.
16 The Archdiocese of Sa˜o Paolo, Torture in Brazil: A Shocking Report on the Pervasive use of Torture
by Brazilian Military Governments, 1964–1979 (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1998), p. 41.
17 James S. Henry, The Blood Bankers: Tales from the Underground Global Economy (New York:
Four Eight Walls, 2003), p. 137. See also John Sinclair, Latin American Television: A Global View
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 66–9.
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In return for this ‘Time Life’ was meant to gain a significant stake in the company.
With this huge advantage over its rivals Globo was able to begin broadcasting on 26
April 1965, from a single station in Rio de Janeiro. By 1972 Globo had stations in
many major cities such as Sao Paolo, Belo Horizonte, Brası´lia and Recife. By 2003
this number had risen to 113 TV stations throughout Brazil.18 From its beginning TV
Globo produced local and national programming in a fashion that has become
synonymous with the company: light entertainment, comedy and populist rather than
factual or educational, in spite of a constitutional requirement for balanced
programming from broadcasters.19 It is a common observation that there is a
dearth of factual programming in South American broadcasting. Perhaps the most
persuasive explanation for this is that rather than it being due to a lack of popular
demand it is more a reflection of the vulnerability of media institutions to state power
in the periphery and semi-periphery. Factual programming in Brazil that exposes
government corruption can get you killed, as a number of journalists for Globo’s
competitors found out in the 1970s. This is hardly an incentive for investigative
reporting.
Quadros unexpectedly resigned the Presidency in 1962 to be replaced by his more
progressive Vice-President Jose Goulart who put forward a national developmental
model (known as the movement for ‘basic reforms’) proposing policies such as a new
educational structure for all, land reform, the nationalising of utilities and oil
refineries, encouraging soldiers to establish a union and legislation to control the
repatriation of profits by foreign MNCs.20 The popularity of the Goulart admin-
istration posed similar problems for US foreign policy and sections of Brazil’s
military and social elites to those of his predecessor Quadros.
Into the semi-periphery, 1964–1985: Globo in the period of conservative
modernisation
The 1964 Coup in Brazil that ushered in a 20-year period of military dictatorship was
a result of two major factors: first, it was an attempt by a section of Brazil’s elite to
resolve the tensions and contradictions of Brazil’s political culture, torn as it was
between the more nationally oriented conservative elite and an internationally
oriented liberal stratum.21 The military believed that only through a state-led
developmental strategy could Brazil hope to resolve these tensions and take
advantage of its potential human and natural resources to transform the country into
a modern industrial state. This policy was two-fold: first, liberalisation of the
economy to attract foreign investment, a policy which subsequently led to systematic
and large-scale corruption between Brazilian elites and North American banks.
Second, the concentration of incomes, intended to make Brazil more attractive to
foreign investors by increasing their profit ratios and reducing the level of taxation
18 Allesandra Dalevi, ‘The Owners of Brazil’, Brazzil Magazine, January 2000, 〈http://
www.brazzil.com/cvrjan00.htm〉, last viewed 18 April 2006.
19 Ibid.
20 Henry, The Blood Bankers, pp. 132–7.
21 Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–1985 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988).
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that might, in turn, be spent on Brazil’s poor and needy. So unpopular were these
policies with the majority of Brazil’s impoverished citizens that they could ultimately
only be imposed by force.22 Hence this became a process of conservative moderni-
sation that sought to balance out Brazil’s national developmental needs without
fundamentally challenging its polarised social structure.23 The liberal right had won
out over the nationalist right in Brazil.24 Brazil’s new developmental policy was to be
an alliance between an authoritarian state, domestic capital and foreign capital.25 In
short, a bureaucratic-capitalist pact.26 Second, the coup was a product of the
geopolitics of the Cold War. Successive US administrations saw the need to support
pro-capitalist social forces in Brazil and throughout South America that would
remain loyal to broader US geopolitical and economic goals. What, then, did
conservative modernisation mean for Globo and Brazil?
Unlike dictatorships in the rest of South America, the Brazilian military were wary
of moving towards a political system led by a strong or charismatic figure, as had
been the case in neighbouring Argentina, for example. The military regimes in Brazil
imposed a governing structure which saw a succession of Generals’ ruling in this
period as part of a collective structure.27 In addition the infrastructure of Brazil
needed to be developed in terms of ideational factors, a sense of collective national
identity. And it is this aspect of conservative modernisation that enabled Globo to
cement its place as the pre-eminent broadcaster in Brazil.
Marinho very quickly moved to work with the military and provide ideological
support for and justification of the coup, branding the Goulart regime and the
politicians associated with it such as future presidential candidate Lionel Brizola as
communists in disguise. This ‘red scare’ strategy was a standard propaganda tool for
Globo in this period. Brazilian critics of Globo described it as the unoﬃcial ‘ministry
of information’, acting as a mouthpiece for the military regime, defending its record
against a wide section of critics in what remained of Brazilian civil society. In return
for its loyal support Globo gained a number of important advantages. First, it gained
licences for radio and TV broadcasting that were denied to its competitors, giving it
a major structural advantage in the developing Brazilian market.28 TV Excelsior, for
example, was eﬀectively killed oﬀ by the military regime in the 1960s.29 Second, as the
key media institution supporting conservative modernisation, it became synonymous
with Brazilian popular and political culture. To speak of TV in Brazil was and is to
speak of Globo. Its competitors complained that Globo had gained anti-competitive
market advantages through its relationship with the military and this was reflected in
its deal with ‘Time Life’. In 1967 the Brazilian Supreme Court duly declared the
‘Time Life’ deal illegal and Globo had to repay its loan to the company, which it did
22 The Archdiocese of Sa˜o Paolo, Torture in Brazil, pp. 49–52; Henry, The Blood Bankers, pp. 134–5.
23 Timothy J. Power, The Political Right in Post-Authoritarian Brazil (Pennsylvania, PA: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000).
24 Henry, The Blood Bankers, ch. 4
25 Peter Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational, State and Local Capital in
Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979).
26 Luis Carlos Bresser Pereira, Economic Crisis and State Reform in Brazil (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 1996), pp. 210–11.
27 Craig L. Arcenaux, Bounded Missions (Pennsylvania, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
2001), ch. 5. Skidmore, Politics in Brazil, chs. 7–8.
28 Henry, The Blood Bankers, pp. 137–8.
29 Joseph D. Straubhaar, ‘Television and Video in the Transition from Military to Civilian Rule in
Brazil’, Latin American Research Review, 24:1 (1989), p. 141.
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by 1972.30 By then it had already obtained the advantages it needed from the
relationship. Globo was producing high quality programmes through the technology
transfer with ‘Time Life’ that would cost its competitors time and money to copy. As
a consequence Globo began to dominate advertising revenue from an early stage with
some figures suggesting that it captures around 80 per cent of total advertising
revenue for TV in Brazil.31 This is a figure greater than that enjoyed by any media
corporation in a national commercial market in the rest of the world. Further,
Globo received no additional punishment for its illegal ‘Time Life’ deal, despite
the protestations of its competitors, reflecting its relationship with the military
regime.
Globo’s relationship to the military evolved in this period as the company grew in
terms of its economic, political and cultural power. In the early years of the
dictatorship Globo was largely dependent on the military for its commercial success.
The military regime acted to block Globo’s competitors through its control of the
issuing of licences and the use of censorship.32 This made perfect sense within the
context of a programme of conservative modernisation. The military needed Globo
to help develop the ideational infrastructure that would establish Brazil’s national
identity. In practice the state established a monopoly control over the establishment
of a communications infrastructure allowing Globo as a private actor to take over the
most profitable and promising area of the media that was not to be monopolised:
broadcast television.33
Globo began to develop local production of its programmes, most importantly its
telenovelas, which became the centrepiece of broadcasting in Brazil. The format of
telenovellas tended to be melodramatic storylines, usually portraying elites in Brazil.
Analysts across the political spectrum viewed the telenovella in this period as
constructed to portray a positive image of Brazil under the military and its ‘economic
miracle’.34 At present Globo broadcasts three nightly telenovellas that capture 30–35
per cent of all TV revenues and earn $32 m annually in sales to 52 countries.35 The
telenovella has been examined by a number of writers who have seen them as an
important public forum for the introduction of social issues in Brazil, from the
impact of political corruption to more recently the expression of gay rights and
homosexuality.36 As we will see, telenovellas have also been vehicles for overt
propaganda during the Presidential elections after Brazil returned to democracy.
However, by the 1970s the military began to grow wary of Globo and its power
and made moves to challenge its authority. Whilst the company remained pre-
eminent, the military allowed a number of Globo’s rivals to develop as a counter-
weight to the monopolistic position of the company. In this phase the relationship
began to change from one in which Globo was overwhelmingly dependent on the
30 John Sinclair, Latin American Television: A Global View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
p. 67.
31 Helen Sousa, ‘Crossing the Atlantic: Globo’s Wager in Portugal’, 〈http://ubista.ubi.pt/wcomum/
sousa-helena-globo-wager-mexico.html〉, last viewed 20 April 2006.
32 Henry, The Blood Bankers, pp. 137–8; Sinclair, Latin American Television, p. 68.
33 Sergio Mattos, The Impact of the 1964 Revolution on Brazilian Television (San Antonio:
Klingensmith, 1982).
34 Straubhaar, ‘Television and Video in the Transition’, p. 144.
35 Michael Kepp and Mike Zellner, ‘The Empire Strikes Again’, Latin Trade (April 2000),
〈http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0BEK/is_4_8/ai_61601027〉, last viewed 16 April 2006.
36 Straubhaar, ‘Television and Video in the Transition’, p. 149.
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military for its development to a codependent relationship where each side had
something to gain, and something to lose, from the power of its partner.37
By 1975 Globo was a major media corporation and sought to assert itself by
moving into the international market. This is where the geolinguistic aspect of the
world system emerges. Globo has the advantage of the domination of a huge
commercial market in Brazil but the disadvantage that its primary language is
Portuguese. Although Portuguese is spoken by over 200 million people globally, it
places limits on the geolinguistic market reach of Globo’s programming. Compared
to Televisa in Mexico, for example, Globo faces a major geolinguistic hurdle. It has
to dub its programmes into other languages (Spanish and English) at great cost if it
is to take full advantage of overseas markets. Its first move was to sell telenovellas to
Portugal from 1976 onwards and they became massively successful. This was
followed in 1985 by investment in TV Monte Carlo with a view to broadcasting to
Portuguese speaking communities in Italy, although it subsequently sold this in
1994.38 Part of the economic weakness of Globo in this period was due to its position
as a company based in a state moving from the periphery to the semi-periphery of the
world system, one which suﬀers regular financial and currency crises.
The period of conservative modernisation had succeeded in pushing Brazil into the
semi-periphery but at major social cost and without addressing the structural
problems aﬀecting the country. In eﬀect, it was development built by debt, and the
creditors were now demanding their money back.39 The military regime had lost what
legitimacy it had because of its economic incompetence and its political authoritari-
anism.40 What was Globo’s position to be as the pro-democracy movement began to
make inroads in Brazilian political culture?
Globo in the age of global communication: 1985 onwards and the return to
democracy
By the late 1970s Brazil’s much-vaunted economic miracle had collapsed in a welter
of debt and corruption with little to show for it by way of resolving the country’s
long-standing social conflicts. In eﬀect, the military regimes that had ruled since 1964
had used their coercive power to co-opt elites and repress the majority of the
population who remained mired in the direst poverty in all the semi-periphery. Globo
had assumed the role of defender of the military regimes in return for favourable
treatment that had enabled the company to grow into a monopolistic national media
organisation with the potential to compete internationally. But the decline of the
military regimes brought a dilemma for Globo as it now had to confront the
possibility of a very diﬀerent kind of political and economic order. The pro-
democracy movement that began its campaign in 1984 was an expression of the
diverse grassroots movements in Brazilian civil society that emerged in the 1970s.41
37 Ibid., p. 142; Sinclair, Latin American Television, p. 69.
38 De Melo, ‘Development of the Audiovisual Industry in Brazil’.
39 Edmar L. Bacha and Pedro S. Malan, ‘Brazil’s Debt’, in Alfred Stepan (ed.), Democratising Brazil.
40 Bertha K. Becker and Claudio A. G. Egler, Brazil: A New Regional Power in the World-Economy,
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41 Margaret E. Keck, The Workers’ Party and Democratisation in Brazil (London: Yale University
Press), ch. 2.
Global communication and political culture: a case study 103
Its goals were a challenge to the elite-led and anti-democratic political culture that
had hitherto shaped Brazilian society.
Whilst its rivals gave coverage to the pro-democracy movement and the series of
large-scale rallies taking place throughout the country, Globo initially chose to ignore
it. Indeed, when it did cover one of the rallies that took place in Sao Paulo in 1984 it
portrayed it as part of a city festival.42 Globo was initially determined to stay loyal to
the military regime. However, its lack of coverage of the pro-democracy campaign
garnered criticism from inside and outside the organisation. Journalists working for
Globo pointed out that it was destroying the credibility of the company to be ignoring
or misrepresenting the campaign.43 There is also evidence that Globo’s management
became increasingly angered by military censorship of their programming.44 As it
became clear that the pro-democracy movement would win both its call for a plebiscite
and the plebiscite itself, and that the military had in turn largely lost the will to govern
the chaos that they had made of Brazilian society, Globo made an important strategic
decision: it decided to cover the campaign. Turning its criticisms onto the military,
Globo began to cover the pro-democracy movements’ rallies and the debates that
ensued, and began to renegotiate its role in Brazilian political culture. If there was to
be a return to democracy Globo needed to secure its monopoly over Brazilian popular
and political culture and its relationship with the newly emerging political order.45
As Straubhaar comments, this does not mean that Globo actively supported the
campaign, rather it was a pragmatic decision based on its commercial interests.46
The successful plebiscite that took place in 1985 led to an interim period of three
years during which a new constitution for Brazil was to be established. In eﬀect
Brazil’s established social and political elites were able to use this period to try to
contain the democratic movement so that it could not fundamentally challenge
existing forms of wealth and power. Rather, the option for the pro-democracy
movement was to work with the elites. Globo’s position during this transition was
crucial as the interim President was to be Tancredo Neves, a man who fully
recognised the power of Globo when he said during a fight over the appointment of
his communications minister (a former Globo employee) ‘I’ll fight with the army
minister, but not with Roberto Marinho’.47 Neves died shortly before he was due to
take oﬃce and his position was taken by Jose´ Sarney, another figure with links to
Globo, illustrating the far-reaching political power of the company.48 Indeed, there
is anecdotal evidence to suggest that Marinho’s political influence by this stage
was so great that he actually interviewed potential ministers for the interim
administration.49
42 Straubhaar, ‘Television and Video in the Transition’, p. 145; Luis Felipe Miguel and Paolo Simoes,
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(November 2000), p. 71.
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Globo and Brazil’s elites were to face a dramatic new challenge in this period as
the left could formally contest elections again in Brazil and in the form of the
Workers’ Party (PT) the left had a representative with longstanding roots in major
social movements.50 Composed of a variety of leftist groups and social movements
the PT espoused a mixture of leftist policies and a commitment to a Gramscian
strategy of a ‘war of position’ to build a long-standing coalition of social forces
that would eventually take over the Brazilian state and direct it towards socialist
ends.51 It is hard to overestimate the significance of the PT for Brazilian political
culture, as no such leftist political party had been allowed to exist before.52 At the
same time Globo faced new competition from within Brazil and internationally
as the impact of New Information and Communication Technology (ICT) took
hold.
The age of globalisation has brought two major challenges to the semi-periphery
in general and to Brazil and Globo in particular: first, globalisation has been
synonymous with democratisation.53 The end of the Cold War saw a wave of
democratisation across Eastern Europe but this process had already begun in other
parts of the world such as Brazil. Nonetheless, this democratisation has not resolved
the social conflicts that characterise the world system; it has merely relocated them to
a diﬀerent level. The danger for the neoliberal elites attempting to drive this process
is that democracy is not easy to control, as the rise of the PT in Brazil illustrates.
Second, the globalisation of capital (the liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation
of financial markets) and of new information and communication technologies, has
led to particularly fierce contests in global media markets and this has presented a
strategic problem for Globo. Globo needed to move into the new communication
market-place emerging in Brazil that will ultimately link the convergence of
telecommunications, computers and mass media (telematics). How could it compete
with media organisations from the core without attracting foreign investment that
might see the Marinho family and Brazilian elites lose control of the company? How
would Globo deal with these twin threats?
Starting with the political threat posed by a newly revived left in Brazil, Globo
moved to the position of gatekeeper to Brazilian political culture. If the left were to
contest Brazil’s Presidential, congressional and state elections then Globo would use
its power to do everything to discredit them. There was to be a parameter of
legitimate political debate and ideas and the leftist populism of the PT and its allies
fell well outside that framework. In practice this meant two things for Globo:
propaganda to discredit the left, particularly the PT Presidential candidate Lula; and
at the same time support for the alliance of establishment parties. Globo’s propa-
ganda was quite stark and is illustrated by a variety of examples. When the first
formal presidential election campaign was under way in 1989 Globo smeared Lula’s
candidacy, accusing him and his party of being communists working for the Soviet
2006. On Globo’s political power, see Venicio A. de Lima, ‘The State, Television and Political
Power in Brazil’.
50 Keck, The Workers’ Party and Democratisation in Brazil.
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53 Robert McChesney, ‘Global Media, Neoliberalism and Imperialism’, Monthly Review (March
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Union in standard ‘red scare’ fashion.54 More powerfully, they ran a story in which
they accused Lula of forcing a former partner into having an abortion, a significant
smear in a country dominated by the Catholic Church.55 In addition to this, Globo
sought to build up the candidacy of Fernando Collor as the outsider who would
sweep away the corruption of Brazilian politics. Collor’s campaign was a mixture of
the honest and incorruptible outsider and the glamorous media-friendly playboy. The
aim was to present a charismatic figure that would unite and help lead a new
consensus around the need for neoliberal reforms that would cut across class lines.
Needless to say, Collor had strong links with Globo.56 The key programme for setting
the agenda for political debate and framing the dominant meaning for events and
issues remains Globo’s long-running Jornal Nacional (on air since 1969), watched
daily by 50 million Brazilians.57
By comparison, Lula appeared to be a rough, poorly educated and old fashioned
figure, ill-suited to a media-driven age, led, of course, by Globo. As Lima has written,
Globo ran three telenovellas during the course of this campaign that featured
story-lines favourable to Collor in which the handsome outsider arrives in town and
takes on the corrupt forces that govern it.58 The final attempt to undermine Lula
came with the presidential candidate head-to head TV debates. Globo was accused by
its critics of selecting clips that showed Collor in the best possible light and Lula in
the worst.59 Despite the barrage of propaganda it has to be noted that the PT did very
well in this and subsequent elections, indicating the strength of their social movement
as an alternative network of communication, as well as the limitations of Globo’s
power as a monopolistic media corporation. Globo’s anti-leftist propaganda contin-
ued in subsequent Presidential elections in 1994 and 1998, even after the resignation
and near-impeachment of Collor and the ultimate failure of the Cardoso admin-
istration to solve Brazil’s economic crises. The oﬃcial public sphere in Brazil
remained a guided forum within which the commercial media in general and Globo
in particular held power of selection and representation of issues. Such was Globo’s
paranoia regarding its role and image as gatekeeper to the Brazilian public sphere
that in 1993 it bought the rights to the documentary ‘Beyond Citizen Kane’, made by
Simon Hobart, in order to prevent it being shown. Hobart’s documentary was an
unfavourable account of the political power and influence of Globo in Brazil.
What then of the commercial challenge from globalisation to Globo in this period?
Brazilian media ownership had been locked in a familiar pattern of family-dominated
ownership structures and state protection. Whilst these had been important for the
development of Globo during the period of dictatorship, the globalisation of finance
and investment and the intensification of competition, in what are increasingly global
media markets, presented a new challenge. Globo’s strategy in response to this was
54 Venicio A. de Lima, ‘Brazilian Television in the 1989 Presidential Election: Constructing a
President’, in Thomas Skidmore (ed.), Television, Politics and the Transition to Democracy in Latin
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two-fold. First, it remained committed to high-quality production in its domestic
markets, hoping to hold oﬀ its competitors through the quality of the shows it
produced.60 To a large extent this has been a successful strategy in that despite the
increasing power of some of Globo’s competitors it remains by some distance the
pre-eminent broadcaster in Brazil. This can be measured in terms of the quantity of
shows produced and the money it spends on producing them, as well as the
percentage of advertising revenue it continues to secure. Globo has the largest reach
of any Brazilian broadcaster, reaching approximately 99.9 per cent of the potential
national audience.61 This domestic strategy was further enhanced through the 1996
Telecommunications Act that consolidated cable distribution rights in Brazil under a
duopoly of Globo and its main but subordinate competitor Abril.62 Although slow to
act in the new technology market compared to Abril, Globo has had the financial
power to catch up through its use of strategic partnerships.63 Ultimately it was
Globo’s investment in cable and the internet that led to its financial crisis at the end
of the millennium.64
Second, although the consolidation of Globo’s domestic market position was
secure, the problem of global competition and debt remained. How was it to secure
the investment needed to create the cable and internet infrastructure it wanted to
build in Brazil? In order to achieve this, Globo pursued a series of unprecedented
partnerships with companies from the core such as Microsoft and News Corporation
to help fund the Direct to Home (DTH) satellite broadcasting and cable infra-
structure.65 It also borrowed heavily from North American banks. In order to secure
the foreign investment it needed Globo had to push for a change in the Brazilian
constitution that would allow for greater foreign investment (49 per cent) in Brazilian
companies, the law that had been illegally breached in its earlier deal with ‘Time
Life’. The introduction of new Information, Communication and Technology
markets (Cable, Satellite, Pay-per-view, the Internet) in Brazil have been dominated
by the already powerful media corporations, the most important of which, as Amaral
notes, is Globo.66
These challenges to Globo were taking place against a background of inter-elite
conflict in Brazil between those pushing to implement neoliberal reforms and those
hoping to preserve the more traditional mixture of free trade and state-protectionist
policies. Brazil introduced a series of neoliberal changes after 1989: reforming the
domestic financial system in 1989; liberalising international capital flows 1989–1992;
liberalising foreign trade 1990–94.67 Between 1996 and 2002 Brazil’s privatisation
60 Allesandra Dalevi, ‘The Owners of Brazil’. Unlike other South American countries the Brazilian
TV market is dominated by domestic programmes rather than imports. Globo shows 98 per cent
domestic content during its primetime. Jo Johnson, ‘The United States of Television’, The Financial
Times, 21 July 2003.
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programme attracted $US30 bn which was spent on the purchase of the best
public-sector industries: gas, electricity, financial and telecommunications.68 The
appeal of neoliberalism was strong in Brazilian political culture from Collor through
Itamar Franco to Cardoso as it carried a potent anti-statist and pro-individual
freedom message.69 In a country recovering from two decades of military rule and
endemic corruption it is not diﬃcult to understand the rhetorical appeal that such an
ideology would have across the social spectrum.
The impact of these neoliberal policies was initially attractive to Globo too as it
meant it would be increasingly able to establish strategic partnerships with core
companies in order to maximise its international appeal. By this stage Globo had
developed into a major global corporation placing it in the second tier of global
media firms.70 Nonetheless, there were problems for Globo that could not be resolved
by the actions of the company alone. Two major problems placed the company in
unprecedented diﬃculties by the end of the millennium: the corruption and incom-
petence of the establishment parties running Brazil’s new democratic political culture
was clear for all to see. Successive administrations had failed to address Brazil’s social
and economic problems and corruption remained a major structural feature of
politics. This is illustrated by the dispersal of TV and radio licences in Brazil as
mechanisms to gain political support for the state. As Fox notes, of the 302 licensed
commercial TV stations in 1995, 94 were owned by politicians or ex-politicians, and
1,169 out of 2,908 radio stations.71 The rise of the PT as a socialist alternative was a
genuine threat to Globo and the political system. Second, the failure of democratic
administrations led to a major financial crisis in 1997–98 as part of a series of
globalised financial crises that started in the Far-East (Thailand) and spread
to Eastern Europe and South America. The globalisation of Information and
Communication Technologies (ICTs) was to lead, as Harvey has noted, to the
compression of time and space, in practice intensifying the speed and volume of
capitalist transactions and placing states outside the core increasingly at the mercy of
global capital flows.72 As a consequence, Brazil’s currency was massively devalued
and Globo suddenly found itself on the point of defaulting on its loans to North
American banks.73 Globalisation and neoliberalism had turned out to be disciplinary
processes for both the public sector and the private sector alike and Globo was in a
deep crisis. According to the Forbes annual billionaire survey, in 2000 the Marinho
family had been worth $US6.4 bn. By 2002 they were down to less than $US1 bn.
Globo’s income had deteriorated from $US260 m per annum in 2000 to $US21.1 m
in 2001.74 Globo had debts of around $US3.2 bn, 55 per cent of the debt of all
Brazilian media.75
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The impact of economic globalisation was to render the semi-periphery even more
vulnerable to currency crises and deepening inequality.76 In Brazil the richest 10 per
cent of the population receive 46.7 per cent of earnings and the bottom 10 per cent
receive only 0.5 per cent.77 The ultimate failure of the lauded ‘Real Plan’ might have
led to Cardoso’s defeat in the 1998 Presidential election but proved instead to be
another example of Globo’s power to frame the news in Brazil. As Miguel and
Simoes argue, Globo sought to turn the economic crisis into a triumph for Cardoso
by insisting it was caused by the actions of globalisation over which Cardoso could
have little control. What’s more, only Cardoso possessed the experience needed to
steer Brazil through this crisis.78
By the time that the PT candidate Lula was elected as President of Brazil in
2002 Globo had already positioned itself to cope with a President who had good
reasons for regarding them as a major obstacle to his reform programme. The
mainstream political figures in Brazilian political culture had been discredited by
the failures of successive post-democracy administrations.79 Corruption remained a
deeply-rooted problem and the living conditions of the majority of Brazilians
remained the worst in the semi-periphery. The Marinho family had made overtures
to the PT, and a number of important changes had taken place since the 1998
Presidential elections that suggested the threat of a Lula Presidency to Globo and
Brazil’s elite was more rhetorical than real. After the 1998 election the PT began
to change its political rhetoric and a section of its left-wing were expelled from the
party.80 Lula himself had a transformation of image to make him appear more
modern and mainstream to voters and he committed himself publicly and often to
the IMF packages agreed to by his predecessors.81 In order to be credible with
Globo and international financial institutions Lula abandoned substantive social
commitments in key areas of his programme and placed ‘economic stability’ before
anything else.82 So far did Lula shift his political position that Globo and
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significant sections of Brazil’s capitalist class were able to endorse his candidacy in
the 2002 election.83
In truth Lula faced an unenviable position as President: he was inheriting a state
and social institutions that had been built to defend the social structure of Brazil, not
to transform it.84 As such it was hardly going to be sympathetic to his more radical
ambitions. The threat of the military intervening remained a factor and the power of
global capital to destroy the Brazilian economy had been illustrated by the financial
crisis of 1997–98. In addition systematic violence against the Workers Party,
including assassinations of Mayoral candidates, remains a fact of Brazilian political
life. In 2000 alone 65 activists for the Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST)
were murdered.85 In oﬃce the recently re-elected Lula has been a disappointment to
many of his supporters and is regularly denounced for selling out his long-standing
commitments.86 Around 70 per cent of Brazilians remain in poverty.87 In addition
there have been problems of corruption attached to Lula’s administration, though
not to him personally, that have led to calls by his opponents for his impeachment.88
Thus, Lula has been subject to a range of disciplinary mechanisms at the national and
global level that have severely undermined his autonomy to act within the formal
framework of Brazil’s neoliberal democracy. Finally, the Workers’ Party itself has
been subject to an ongoing internal ideological fight between those who accept
neoliberalism, those that want to modify it and those that fundamentally oppose it.89
Globo plays a major part in this in its role as gatekeeper to Brazilian political culture,
primarily through two powers: the power to set agendas for discussion and the power
to frame the meaning of issues.
As has been seen in many South American countries in the past five years, the rise
of nominally leftist governments has highlighted the separation between the social
movements that put them into power and the governments themselves. Thus far, only
the Chavez government in Venezuela has been significantly radicalised by its
grass-roots social movement.90 In Brazil and elsewhere the political leadership has
attempted to tame and limit the expectations of its grassroots for the time being,
though there are signs that this might be changing.91 So for Globo the Lula
Presidency has proven less of a diﬃculty than it would have imagined when Brazil
first returned to democracy. Indeed, Lula declared three days of mourning for
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Roberto Marinho when he died in August 2003.92 By all indicators Lula has
performed to a level that has garnered support from international financial institu-
tions and significant sections of Brazil’s elites, including pursuing steeper cuts in
public spending than those demanded by the IMF.93
Thus the globalisation of democracy has not, so far, caused Globo the dilemmas
it might have anticipated from a PT Presidency. Instead, the bigger problem it has
faced was caused by the impact of neoliberal policies within Brazil and across the
world system. As noted in the previous section, by November 2002 the Brazilian
currency had depreciated 38.7 per cent in that year alone and Globo was forced to file
for bankruptcy protection to rid itself of its $US1,500 m debt.94 This led it to sell oﬀ
parts of the company as a means of restructuring its debt and in 2003 it lobbied the
state to oﬀer financial support in the form of a long-term low-cost loan.95 This was
one area where Lula could bring pressure to bear on Globo as he could quite
reasonably refuse the loan on the grounds that it was an illegitimate interference in
the workings of the market. Neoliberal principles could be used to bite Globo and
force it to pursue diﬀerent options.
Given its hold over the Brazilian media market, Globo was always a potentially
attractive investment for capitalists from the core and with the Real devalued by
the currency crisis of 1997–98 it was an increasingly aﬀordable one.96 In eﬀect the
restructuring package that Globo eventually organised was made possible by the
deeper integration of Brazil into the economic order of the world system. As Brazil
liberalised its economy and reformed its domestic law to allow for greater foreign
investment, Globo was open to forms of partnership that would previously have been
far more limited in scope.97 In February 2002 the House of Representatives passed a
constitutional amendment allowing Brazil’s media companies to open themselves to
foreign ownership of up to 30 per cent of their total share capital. As something of
a compromise to Brazil’s more protectionist history, editorial control of the
companies must remain in the hands of a Brazilian citizen or naturalised Brazilians
of ten years’ standing. In addition, Brazil’s written and broadcast media can now be
managed by legal entities. Prior to this only natural persons could do so. The
significance of this is that it provides a mechanism enabling Globo and other
Brazilian media to attract capital from the core and to transform the ownership and
management of the company out of the hands of the Marinho family into a
partnership with other capitalists.98 The limitation of it so far is that capital in the
core views debt-ridden media corporations in the semi-periphery such as Globo as a
92 Alex Bellos, ‘Roberto Marinho’, The Guardian Newspaper, 8 August 2003, 〈http://
www.guardian.co.uk/brazil/story/0,,1014553,00.html〉, last viewed 20 April 2006.
93 Richard Adams, ‘American Presidents all Mixed Up’, The Guardian Newspaper, 6 July 2004. Sue
Branford, ‘The Bankers Think they’ve Tamed Lula’, The Guardian Newspaper, 10 July 2003.
94 LatAm, ‘Brazilian TV O Globo HQ declares Chapter 11 to Get Rid of Debts’,
Digest.Liderdigital.com, 7 November 2002, 〈http://www.digest.liderdigital.com/noticias/
detalle_noticia.php?id_noticia=15〉, last viewed 17 April 2006.
95 Carlos Castilho, ‘Globo: Death of a Brazilian Media Empire?’, Mediachannel, 1 April 2004,
〈http://www.mediachannel.org/views/dissector/aﬀalert167.shtml〉, last viewed 15 August 2007.
96 Mike Kepp, ‘Massive M and A Madness?’, Latin Trade, 10 October 2002, 〈http://
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potentially risky investment.99 In May 2005, after three years of negotiations, Globo
finally concluded its restructuring package, Brazil’s largest ever corporate bond
restructuring. $1.23 bn of debt was restructured with its investors accepting a mixture
of cash and bonds, enabling Globo to avoid selling the TV stations that it put up as
collateral for the initial loans.100
The death of Roberto Marinho in 2003 formalised the takeover of the company by
his three sons that had in eﬀect been in place for some years. Reports suggest some
tension within the family as to the future direction that Globo will take but it is hard
to see how it can develop further without becoming increasingly subordinate to and
integrated with capital from the core of the world system. Despite Globo’s power and
Brazil’s potential core status, the continuing debt crisis and the subordination of
social and economic policy to core-controlled international financial institutions
illustrates starkly the vulnerability of even the most powerful states and companies in
the semi-periphery to a system that they neither built nor significantly control.101 It
seems safe to say that Globo’s position as gatekeeper to Brazilian political culture will
remain but that its eﬀectiveness in that role will be limited by the reality of life in
Brazil for the majority. The social movements that propelled Lula to the Presidency
will not disappear and their demands cannot be ignored indefinitely, a problem that
the ideological power of Globo cannot hide.
Conclusions: The challenges of the globalisation of communication for Globo
I would like to conclude this article by reflecting on the ways in which the issues
raised here connect with two of the three main themes of this Issue of the Review of
International Studies. The third theme raised in this Issue is a concern with the ways
in which International Relations addresses global problems and relates them to the
discipline. I am reticent to move too deeply into this subject as it requires an article
in itself, but succinctly I would say that WSA raises profound intellectual objections
to orthodox international relations as framed by the neo-neo debate. For all its flaws,
WSA oﬀers a far more persuasive approach to understanding global problems and
issues than orthodox International Relations (IR) theory. Its relationship to IR
remains limited in that IR is built on a theoretical framework that provides a very
diﬀerent ontology and epistemology to that of WSA. As Wallerstein has made clear
on numerous occasions, WSA rejects both a state-centric model of the world system
and positivism as a method for the production of knowledge, both of which are
central to the neo-neo debate.
The first theme raised by the Special Issue is a concern with the ways in which
international or global studies approach the question of communication. It is more
accurate to describe WSA as a form of global studies given that its ontological
starting point is the world system as a single unit of analysis. This article illustrates
that WSA is sensitive to the ways in which communication becomes a contest of
99 Kepp, ‘Massive M and A Madness?’.
100 Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘Media: Brazil’, 9 May 2005. Private report purchased from the
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representation between diﬀerent social forces to establish the boundaries of Brazilian
political culture. As has been shown, it is the Globo Corporation that has held the
dominant communication power in Brazil to frame representations and set an agenda
for political discussion, initially in a subordinate relationship with the state, but later
assuming a codependent role. Globo has been able to utilise its vast resources to
represent a particular idea of Brazil and of legitimate political discourse that tends to
reflect the interests of Brazil’s elites. The poor and dispossessed are only admitted
into these formal, mainstream debates in political culture if they accept the legitimacy
of existing social structures, not if they wish to challenge them. The trajectory of
Lula’s career is illustrative of the ways in which Globo’s power of representation can
act to help constrain anti-systemic (subaltern) social forces. Again, it needs to be
stressed; this power is not permanent or unchallengeable. As I made clear in the
article, for all its monopoly of the means of communication and representation in
Brazil, there is a vibrant grass-roots oppositional political culture rooted in long-
standing social movements that stand in opposition to the social structures that
Globo is both part of and acts to defend. These groups represent a very diﬀerent form
of communication network.
The second issue raised in this section regards the mobility of ideas and this
connects with the power of representation. Historically Globo has acted with the
state to constrain and control the dissemination of ideas through the control of the
means of communication and the use of censorship, state violence and propaganda.
The move to a democratic system in Brazil has changed this and led Globo to assume
the role of gatekeeper in a guided democratic system. At the same time Brazil has
become more integrated into the world system and is subject to both pressures from
global capital as well as the national and regional pressures of domestic Brazilian
social forces. Although there is more space for ideas to be expressed in Brazilian
political culture there are now diﬀerent layers of mechanisms in place that can act to
filter acceptable and unacceptable ideas and discourse. This is illustrated by the crisis
in Brazil over the failure of the Real Plan, for example, which might have destroyed
Cardoso’s Presidency if Globo and other national and international media outlets
had not been able to make the case that Cardoso was the only figure capable of
steering Brazil through this troubled period.
Turning to the second theme of the special issue, what does WSA tell us about the
globalisation of communication with regard to Globo and Brazil? The globalisation
of communication coupled with the liberalisation of financial markets has seen Globo
develop into a major second-tier communication corporation. However, these
benefits are mixed for Globo. Globo is a global communication corporation with
distinct strategic advantages in the production of particular goods and services.
However, its ability to build on these advantages remains limited by Brazil’s
weakness as a state in the semi-periphery, a state that is particularly vulnerable to the
speculative financial control of capitalists in the core. Far more so than India or
China, the Brazilian market is still limited by the poverty and inequality in the
country and this imposes limits on Globo’s ability to grow through domestic sales
alone. Its need to form alliances with the likes of Sky and Microsoft and to
restructure its debts through banks in the core reflects the limits of Globo’s ability to
transcend its location in the semi-periphery.
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